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MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

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MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

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THE PROBLEM

To assess the extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc military collaboration with the Castro regime, to examine in detail the Cuban military buildup since Castro came to power, to estimate the intentions of the Castro regime with regard to this buildup.

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I
CONCLUSIONS

1. The Bloc has already extended considerable military assistance to Cuba in the form of some 10,000 to 12,000 tons of military equipment and some military and economic technicians and advisers. Thus far, some 6 helicopters, large quantities of machineguns and other small arms have been positively identified. However, based on an analysis of tonnages delivered, types¹ and quantities of materiel delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba, we believe that the Bloc shipments thus far probably included medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, field and anti-aircraft artillery, and mortars. The estimate of the quantities and types of equipment received from Bloc sources shown in Annex I is intended only to indicate a rough order of magnitude and should be considered as tentative. There is no hard evidence that Cuba has received MIG aircraft, nor is there any evidence they have received nuclear weapons, missiles or other sophisticated weapons. Bloc assistance is likely to be continued and expanded, though it is highly unlikely that Soviet nuclear weapons or the latest models of major military items will be included in the foreseeable future. Military training of Cubans in the Bloc is already underway and Soviet Bloc military technicians are in Cuba. No Chinese Communist military personnel have been identified as being in Cuba at this time.

2. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country is likely to conclude a formal mutual defense agreement with Cuba committing them to active participation in military operations in defense of that country, or to establish military bases there. Khrushchev's statements implying Soviet military

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support for Cuba in the event of a US attack have been qualified and were calculated to create a presumption of Soviet intentions rather than an actual Soviet commitment. At the same time, it opened the way for the Soviet Union to claim credit for deterring an attack by anti-Castro forces. We believe it highly unlikely that the USSR would consider the survival of the Castro regime so important as to require them to pursue courses of action that would risk war with the US.

3. There is currently no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing a "volunteer" force for military service in Cuba. Moreover, it is unlikely that any Bloc country would seriously contemplate the development of such a force for deployment to Cuba, in view of the difficulty in supporting such a force logistically and the risk of having such a force become involved in a conflict with the United States under circumstances disadvantageous to them.

4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has nevertheless gone a long way toward identifying itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. Its economic assistance is considerable. The successful Soviet effort to provide Cuba with all its petroleum needs has been at considerable expense and disruption to its normal tanker operations and the Soviet Union has given priority to other Cuban needs even on occasion at the expense of other trading partners.

5. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's support for the Castro regime is part of its larger efforts to isolate the United States and to weaken and eventually destroy its influence throughout the world. The Soviets desire to establish Cuba as a secure base of operations for furthering their Communist aims throughout Latin America. The Castro regime

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has already become an effective instrument of the Bloc toward achieving these ends in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, among underdeveloped and emerging nations throughout the world. Cuba provides a better base of operations for subversion and propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. They will probably avoid seeking an open Communist seizure of power in Cuba or elsewhere. A strongly anti-American and pro-Soviet but not avowedly Communist regime like Castro's serves their purpose far better; it gives a native color to Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention.

6. The Soviet Bloc military equipment already shipped to Cuba, as well as prior military purchases by Castro from Western sources, have contributed substantially to a major buildup of ground forces there. This is reflected in the great expansion of personnel in the Cuban military and militia forces. Before Castro, the ground forces consisted of a 21,000-man army and a national police force of 7,650. The present Cuban ground forces consist of the Revolutionary Army of approximately 32,000, the Revolutionary National Police of 9,000, and the militia estimated at 200,000. The combat capabilities of the army and the militia are now low, but can be expected to increase steadily. The navy and the air force have generally deteriorated in capabilities.

7. Initially, the purpose of Cuba's military buildup was self defense. Anti-Castro guerrillas have been active in several areas inside Cuba and exile groups pose a constant invasion threat. However, the current sharpening and strengthening of all the instruments of police state control suggest that the related motive

of tightening the dictatorship is an equal, if not presently the prime, purpose of the military buildup. The regime, which has set out to impose a thorough socio-economic revolution on the country at a faster pace than probably any other government in history, evidently estimates that its domestic objectives can be achieved only through the regimentation of the Cuban people under a police state. This clearly parallels the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party and thus furthers the aims of the international Communist movement.

8. The militia is a primary instrument of the state in strengthening and extending its control. Drawn from wide sectors of the population, though primarily from urban and rural lower income groups, a hard core of the militia is well-equipped and is organized with increasing efficiency while a larger portion is undergoing regular part time military training. Some militia units have been assigned to duties normally carried out by the armed forces. The militia provides the government with a substantial armed force with which to control the populace as a whole and subjects a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination. At the same time, it contributes toward solving the serious unemployment problem. Communist influence in the militia is extensive.

9. The Castro regime is convinced that the Cuban revolution is the vanguard of "the anti-imperialist rebellion" that will inevitably sweep all of Latin America. It is actively encouraging and covertly assisting Communist and Communist-influenced revolutionary groups in other Latin American countries at every opportunity. Its methods include intensive propaganda supported by the Castro-subsidized

international news agency that has close working ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc news agencies and actually reflects the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping. Cuban diplomatic missions have frequently provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial assistance. The arms buildup in Cuba will permit the Cubans to supply weapons to pro-Castro groups in other countries. Receipt of Bloc military equipment permits Cuba to furnish Western-manufactured arms now in their possession for this purpose. The reshipment of Bloc arms to other Latin American countries will probably be avoided for some time in order to remove the unfavorable implications that might arise from their discovery.

10. Cuban subversion is further supported by the Castro-subsidized travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans who are exposed there to further political indoctrination and, according to frequent reports, given military training.

11. Direct Cuban intervention against another government in the form of a large scale Cuban-based invasion force does not appear likely at present. Cuban assistance to rebel movements in other countries will probably continue, however. Under certain circumstances, only a small quantity of weapons would be sufficient to seriously threaten a government already weakened by internal subversion. Cuban arms aid is likely to be limited for the most part to Communist or Communist-influenced groups and provided when Cuban leaders estimate that the planned revolution has a reasonable chance of success.

12. There are indications that Guatemala may have been selected as one of the promising targets for further Cuban-directed revolutionary

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action, though the 13 November revolt in that Country does not appear to have been inspired from Cuba. Cuba is reliably reported to have last month provided the Guatemalan Communist party and a Communist-infiltrated revolutionary group in Guatemala with financial support and the promise of arms aid. Ex-President Arbenz and top Guatemalan Communist leaders are presently in Cuba and probably have a role in Cuban plans. Cuba may also provide material support for the strong Communist and pro-Communist opposition to Venezuelan President Betancourt. However, there is as yet no evidence of direct Cuban involvement in the various Central American outbreaks in mid-November.

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II

DISCUSSION

1. Following the seizure of power by the Castro regime in January 1959, intermittent Cuban military contacts were made with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries--notably Czechoslovakia--but these apparently did not result in firm military aid commitments until the early summer of 1960. As Cuba's efforts to purchase military goods in the Free World became increasingly difficult throughout 1959 and early 1960, Cuban arms purchasing missions traveled to the Bloc to investigate new sources of supply. Discussions reportedly covered a whole range of equipment from small arms to modern jet aircraft.

2. These preliminary contacts may have crystallized during First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960, when Moscow abandoned its policy of aloofness toward the Cuban revolution and publicly announced its support of the Castro regime. Mikoyan's visit signaled the beginning of a series of trade and aid agreements between Cuba and nearly all countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. As political and economic contacts were established, it became apparent that the Bloc intended to back up its propaganda support for Cuba with a major campaign of material assistance.

3. Soviet activities in exploiting the rapid deterioration of US-Cuban relations, however, were inhibited during the spring of 1960 by the impending summit conference and President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to the USSR. With the collapse of the summit in May and the cancellation of the President's trip, these inhibitions were removed and the Bloc launched a more intensive drive to expand its influence over

the Castro regime. In the post-summit period this campaign has included public attacks on the validity of the Monroe Doctrine and assurances of Soviet support in the event of economic or military measures that the US might undertake against Cuba. These assurances--including the ambiguous references to retaliation with missiles--have been phrased broadly enough to cover the supply of military equipment and technical assistance without committing the USSR to specific military action in support of Cuba.

4. Soon after the summit collapse in May, Cuban military negotiations apparently were undertaken with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Czech-Cuban talks in Havana during May and June were immediately followed up by a trip to Prague and Moscow by Cuban Minister of Armed Forces Raul Castro. Presumably agreements were concluded during these negotiations to provide for future deliveries of Bloc arms.

5. During the summer of 1960, probably in early July, at least one partial cargo of Czech small arms and ammunition was delivered to Cuba, along with five Mi-4 HOUND helicopters. Shortly thereafter, about 60 Cuban military personnel were sent to Czechoslovakia to receive military training, including flight and artillery instruction. By the end of August nearly 150 Cubans were receiving military training in Czechoslovakia.

6. Further military talks during July and August probably were held concerning detailed arrangements for the delivery of Soviet Bloc arms, accompanied by military technicians to provide the necessary training. Not until September 1960, however, did major shipments get under way. Between 8 September and 18 October, four Soviet vessels delivered at least 10,000 tons of material to Cuba. Two other vessels have delivered partial military cargos. Additional deliveries are expected but none

were known to be scheduled or en route as of 15 November.

7. Because of the stringent security precautions surrounding the off-loading of military cargoes in Cuba, information on the types and quantities of Bloc materiel is fragmentary. Reliable reports indicate, however, that shipments consisted of a complete range of land armaments, including medium tanks, field and antiaircraft artillery, military vehicles, radar and communications equipment, and large quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition, helicopters and possibly other aircraft have been delivered.

8. Reports persist that MIG jet fighters are already in Cuba, but these have not been confirmed. Soviet vessels have delivered crates which could accommodate fighter aircraft, but the observed dimensions of these crates do not correlate with those used to deliver jet fighters to other areas. Moreover, it is believed that Castro would not delay displaying such military items for prestige purposes and as evidence of Cuba's military strength.

9. Bloc military deliveries to Cuba thus far have significantly assisted the Castro regime in its attempts to develop a greater military capability. Despite a long build-up, the Cuban army had almost no anti-aircraft defense capability, and artillery and armored support was negligible before the arrival of this type of Bloc equipment. In addition, the considerable quantities of modern Bloc small arms and ammunition have enabled the regime to establish and maintain an expanding civilian militia. If the Soviet Bloc follows its pattern of furnishing military equipment to non-Bloc countries, it is very unlikely that Cuba will be provided with nuclear weapons, missiles, highly advanced aircraft other than MIG-15's and 17's and other sophisticated weapons.

10. Several small groups of Cuban military trainees reportedly were sent to the Bloc prior to the summer of 1960, but no information is available to confirm these reports. In July and August, however, two large groups of Cubans were sent to Czechoslovakia and their mission probably involved military instruction, including artillery, methods and training as pilots and ground crews. Altogether, from 100 to 150 Cubans currently are engaged in military training activities in Czechoslovakia, and perhaps a small number also are in the USSR. It appears likely that cadets with little previous military experience were sent for training in the Bloc. If so, Cuban student pilots may be receiving only preliminary flight instruction in Czechoslovakia and they may return to Cuba for jet transition training on Bloc aircraft, which if not already delivered, can be expected to arrive by the time this training is completed.

11. Precise information is unavailable on the numbers and activities of Bloc military technicians in Cuba. Based primarily on Bloc military technical assistance to other non-Bloc countries and the estimated arms shipments to Cuba thus far, it is believed that from 100 to 200 Czech and Soviet technicians currently are working in military capacities for the Cuban government. Other reports have indicated that this number may be somewhat larger, but we believe that most of these have tended to be exaggerated. No Chinese Communist military personnel are believed to be in Cuba, although the possibility cannot be entirely discounted.

12. Soon after the arrival of the first large Bloc arms shipment in September, Czech and Soviet technicians reportedly were assisting the

Cuban military in assembling equipment and installing such weapons as antiaircraft batteries. They probably are employed also as instructors in military courses and as advisors to individual military units.

13. There is no evidence that Soviet Bloc or other nationals are being trained in the Bloc for military duty in Cuba. There is no evidence that any Sino-Soviet-Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing "volunteer" forces for military service in Cuba. Moreover, it is unlikely that any Bloc country would seriously contemplate the development of such a force for deployment to Cuba in view of the difficulty in supporting such a force and the risk of having such a force become involved in a conflict with the United States.

14. Cuba's military forces have been drastically altered since 1 January 1959. The traditional forces remaining in Cuba following the fall of the Batista regime have been weakened through the replacement of many experienced career men with untrained recruits who were judged to be more loyal to the Minister of Revolutionary Armed Forces, Raul Castro. Further, the regime has sought to transfer many of the responsibilities of the conventional armed forces to the newly-created Revolutionary Militia, which the government considers to be a politically more reliable military force.

15. The ground forces under Batista consisted of a 21,000-man Army and a National Police Force of 7,600 who were relatively well-trained and well-disciplined by Latin American standards. Following Castro's victory, virtually all elements of Batista's ground forces were gradually removed. About one-fifth of the present Revolutionary

Army of some 32,000 men were active in guerrilla operations against Batista, and the remainder is composed of personnel who joined the Revolutionary movement when its success had been assured. A similar situation is believed to exist in the 9,000-man Revolutionary National Police organization. Much of the Army effort since 1 January 1959 has been devoted to non-military activities; personnel assigned to public works projects account for the troop strength increase over Batista's army.

16. Recent reports indicate increased emphasis on training and on improving the discipline and appearance of troops. These efforts appear to have had some success. Arms shipments from Free World and Soviet Bloc countries have largely eliminated previous shortages of field and antiaircraft artillery, armor, and close-support weapons. The increased emphasis on training and the presence of Bloc military advisors in Cuba should gradually reduce the present shortage of personnel trained in the effective utilization of these weapons. Although the Revolutionary Army has an extremely limited capability to conduct conventional operations against a well-trained, modern, combined-arms force, it remains the most effective guerrilla or counter-guerrilla force in Cuba today. Its combat capabilities may be expected to increase steadily. (For detailed estimates of the types and amounts of weapons and military equipment available to Cuban ground forces on 1 January 1959 and at the present time, see Annex 1)

17. The civilian Revolutionary Militia represents the major increase in the size and capability of Castro's ground forces over those

available to Batista. It is estimated to have as many as 200,000 members. First appearing as early as November 1959, loosely-organized units of students, workers, and farmers were officially established in early January 1960. Training varied widely from unit to unit and reflected the initiative and energy of individual commanders. In general, however, militia training has been more uniform and extensive than that conducted by the Army.

18. During the year, militia units have been gradually assuming many duties which formerly were exclusively performed by the Army and the National Police. They have effectively performed crowd control duties, such as at the time of the Cayo Cruz ammunition dump explosion, and they have acted as security forces in port areas while Soviet Bloc arms shipments have been unloaded. Militia units have been used in field operations against counterrevolutionary elements, and they have effected the takeover of intervened businesses and are used in guarding vital industries and utilities against possible sabotage efforts.

19. Castro appears to be increasingly reliant on the militia to maintain his regime in power. Training continues to improve; a more formal organization is being established; and a growing number of militiamen are apparently on an extended-active-duty status. Militia units presently are being trained on newly received Bloc crew-served weapons. The combat capability of the militia, considered low at this time, is improving daily. Increased responsibility, improved organization, and intensified training should produce a relatively effective force within a six- to twelve-month period.

20. The Cuban Navy has progressively declined in combat capability since the fall of the Batista regime. Raul Castro's moves to bring the Revolutionary Navy firmly under his control have resulted in a reduction in total naval personnel from a pre-Castro figure of 6430 to an estimated 4000-5000 at the present time. The Naval Air Arm was dissolved by the government in July 1960 and its functions and equipment were transferred to Air Force installations. The 31 US Navy-trained pilots who had completed training during the past seven years were discharged and called unsuitable for future work with the Cuban government. Many naval personnel have been assigned to duties of a non-military nature, such as working for the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, serving as administrators in intervened businesses, and assisting in the construction of public works projects.

21. At the time of the takeover from Batista, the Cuban Navy consisted of the following: 3 PF, 2 PCE, 1 PGM, 2 AG, 2 ATR, 9 YAG, and 29 YP. No additional ships have been acquired since that time, although Cuban purchasing missions have unsuccessfully sought to buy 15 high-speed Coast Guard craft, three motor torpedo boats, and two buoy tenders from West European countries after funds were budgeted for this purpose in July 1959.

22. The capabilities of the Cuban Air Force have deteriorated sharply since the downfall of the Batista regime. It appears that the primary mission of the Cuban Air Force in the pre-revolutionary period was to support the ground forces in maintaining internal security. The Air Force never had acquired a good offensive or defensive capability against the forces of other nations, and it probably would have been able to offer only token resistance in such an action.

23. The loss of personnel through systematic purges and numerous pilot defections since January 1959 have reduced the combat capability of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) almost to nil. In June 1959, a drastic purge of the Air Force--which probably was in response to orders from Raul Castro--resulted in the dismissal of most of the force's rated pilots. The continuing defection of civil air lines pilots will lessen this source of bolstering the number of pilots available to the Air Force.

24. The total personnel strength of the CRAF remains unknown. At the present time, it is estimated that approximately 100 Air Force personnel are now undergoing training in Soviet Bloc countries--probably including pilot and maintenance training--but there is no confirmation of this estimate. Some training is probably being conducted in Cuba, but the types of training, instructors, and numbers participating are unidentified.

25. Although the total inventory of CRAF aircraft has increased from 63 to 93 since 1 January 1959, there has been little change in totals of combat-type aircraft. The serviceability rate of the CRAF aircraft is presently estimated at 20%. The increase is reflected mainly in helicopters and transport aircraft, with the latter probably representing expropriations of aircraft from private owners, since no information is available concerning acquisition from other sources. The Cuban government has tried unsuccessfully to acquire Hawker Hunters from Belgium and the UK, helicopters from the UK and the US, Vampires from Italy and Canada, F-86's from Canada, Fiat G-91's from Italy, and Provost jet trainers from Austria. No aircraft are known to have been delivered from Free World sources during 1959. (See Annex 2 for a breakdown by type of Cuban military aircraft in 1958 and at the present time.)

26. Cuba has 3 airfields (1 is a USN airfield) with runways capable of supporting all types of jet aircraft except medium and heavy bombers. It also has 7 airfields with runways capable of supporting operations by most types of jet fighters. Parking and fuel facilities are generally limited at most of the airfields. This air facility system is more than adequate for the CRAF and would support a major increase therein. (See map, Annex 4)

27. Construction has been reported at the following:

a. Managua--At Managua (23-02N/082-19W). 10 nautical miles SSW of Havana, a new runway is under construction; it is estimated that it will be 5,000' x 120' upon completion. Present dimensions are approximately 2,800' x 150', and the surface is probably packed earth or crushed rock.

b. Sigüanea--Sigüanea airfield (21-37N/082-55W), on the Isle of Pines, has one runway which has recently been extended to 6,000'; its width is 100'. The surface is crushed marble over marble base. Construction appears to be temporarily suspended.

c. Cayo Largo--A natural-surface landing strip 2,040' x 135' has recently been prepared at approximately 21-37N/081-33W. A cleared area 1,050' long is believed to be a possible extension to the landing strip.

d. New Santa Clara airfield--a new airfield is under construction at 23-31N/079--55W, about 8 nautical miles NNE of the old Santa Clara airfield. Present dimensions of grading work are estimated to be 9300' x 280'. The runway is not completed but is usable.

e. Baracoa--The runway at Baracoa airfield, 23-01N/082-38W, formerly referred to as Domingo Rossillo, has been extended to 5,450'.

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f. Cienaga de Zapata--A firmly packed sod airstrip, about 3,000' to 4,000' long, has been prepared in the Cienaga de Zapata (Zapata Swamp) at approximately 22-17N/081-08W.

28. The principal objectives of the current military buildup are self-defense, internal security, and to a lesser extent the export of arms and trained men to other Latin American countries for revolutionary and subversive purposes. Given the Cuban emphasis on guerrilla warfare, a civilian militia, and subversion, the arms the Cubans have been receiving--especially the large quantities of small arms and automatic weapons--lend themselves to use in connection with all of these objectives. The weapons employed for defense against attack from abroad can be used with equal facility against internal subversion and anti-Castro rebel forces, to arm the militia, or to supply revolutionary groups located in or moving into other Latin American countries. It does not appear that the current arms buildup will place the Cubans in a position to attack any of their neighbors with an organized, overt military force within the foreseeable future.

29. Cuba's efforts to strengthen its military posture have resulted, at least initially, from a genuine fear of foreign-based invasion. Various Cuban statements indicate that Castro views an invasion of the island by anti-government Cubans, supported indirectly or covertly by the United States, as a probability. The Castro regime claims that rebel groups are presently being organized in both the United States and Guatemala, with the knowledge and support of both governments. It is probable that the Cuban government views a direct attack by US armed forces as a possible but less

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likely event. The caution with which they have treated the question of Guantanamo--their obvious desire to avoid provoking direct US military intervention--is evidence that they consider such action a definite possibility. They are also aware of the serious threat to the security position of the United States posed by Cuba's move toward the Soviet camp--a threat which increases with the Cuban arms buildup.

30. In addition to reflecting a genuine fear of invasion, the heated and continuing Cuban charges of an imminent US-supported invasion have been part of a major propaganda effort to villify the United States. This effort is designed to enlist world sympathy for the cause of the Cuban David against the US Goliath, and to draw the attention of the Cuban people away from the economic difficulties which they now face and to prepare them for further sacrifices.

31. A well-equipped military force (with special emphasis on an elite, politically reliable hard core within the revolutionary militia) serves two principal functions in maintaining order within Cuba. First, it enables the regime to deal effectively with the anti-Castro rebels within Cuba who pose a threat to its stability. Second, it provides Castro with a means of extending government control over Cuban society--a policy which is presently considered at least of equal importance as the objective of self-defense.

32. Anti-Castro groups currently active in Cuba, principally in the Sierra Escambray area and in Oriente Province, are not strong enough to pose a significant threat to the stability of the Castro regime. Although the armed opposition within Cuba presently remains largely unorganized, lacks unity, and lacks leaders with widespread public appeal, the history of the 26th of July Movement itself demonstrated the ultimate potential of such forces. Further, opposition elements located outside Cuba are seeking to combine their forces and may, in the future, be in a better position to provide support to those rebels who have remained in Cuba. This in turn makes it incumbent on Castro to maintain his forces at a level sufficient to enable him to meet any foreseeable counterrevolutionary move from within Cuba.

33. The current buildup in arms may now be directed primarily toward extending the Castro government's control over Cuban society and institutions. The major tool of control is the Revolutionary Militia, which serves several purposes. It provides the government with a substantial armed force through which the Cuban populace as a whole can be controlled, and it promotes unquestioning loyalty to Castro by subjecting a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination under the leadership of people dedicated to the revolutionary government. If necessary, it can also provide Castro with a counterpoise to the regular Army, whose political reliability may still be questionable as the result of Castro's efforts to reduce its influence. Finally, the militia offers the government an organized work force for use in economic development and military construction projects, and to

reduce the high unemployment which is plaguing the Castro regime.

34. Since Fidel Castro's assumption of power, Cuba has been involved in several attempts to overthrow other Caribbean governments. During 1959, the Castro regime sponsored or gave indirect support to invasion attempts against Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti. The military buildup provides Cuba with an increased ability to furnish military aid to Communist and pro-Communist revolutionary groups in these or other Latin American countries in the future. Soviet Bloc military equipment now in Cuba permits the use of older, Western-made equipment which would be difficult to trace, for these purposes. There is as yet no evidence of direct Cuban involvement in the outbreaks in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica in mid-November.

35. Cuban leaders and propaganda media repeatedly refer to the Cuban revolution as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist revolution that will "inevitably sweep" the rest of Latin America. Private statements of Fidel Castro reveal his conviction that the United States is "finished" as a great power and that Cuba must therefore side with the "socialist countries which will win the current ideological struggle." "During its present confused state," the United States must be kept on the defensive, Castro told an old friend last September. The Castro regime has become an effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in its drive to weaken and eventually destroy US influence in Latin America as well as in other underdeveloped and emerging nations.

36. The Castro government has made no secret of its antipathy toward most of the governments of the other Latin American republics, charging that these governments do not represent the will of the

people. It is clear that Cuba is determined to export its revolution to the rest of the hemisphere. However, direct Cuban intervention in the form of large-scale Cuban-based invasion forces does not appear likely at the present time. The reaction against Cuba throughout Latin America would be too strong at a time when Cuba needs Latin American sympathy in its struggle with the United States. Further, the Cubans probably fear that such action might provoke US or OAS intervention in Cuba--something they wish to avoid.

37. It can be expected, however, that Cuba will intensify its efforts to weaken and subvert other Latin American governments, particularly in the Caribbean area. In addition to its all-out propaganda effort, Cuba will probably furnish arms, training, financial, and other covert assistance through pro-Castro groups and the Communists apparatus throughout the area to dissident and insurgent Latin American elements. Direct military aid is useful when the climate for rebellion is ripe within a given country, however, and the larger part of Cuban energies in the other Latin American countries will probably be expended in promoting such a climate.

38. The Cuban government is engaged in organizing, financing, and training of revolutionary movements. One facet of Cuban assistance in the training of potential revolutionaries against other Latin American governments is the Castro regime's subsidization of travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans for purposes of ideological and military indoctrination. Numerous delegates to the Latin American Youth Congress in Cuba last summer, for instance, remained to participate in the international Communist-financed "International Work Brigade." The week-long congress of the youth section of the Cuban

Popular Socialist (Communist) party last April also brought delegates from a number of Latin American countries, as did the ceremonies in March marking the "Week of Solidarity with the Struggles of the Latin American Peoples." The latter event, sponsored by the Communist-controlled labor arm of the Castro regime, ended with a manifesto calling for the initiation of an "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution in all of Latin America." It has frequently been reported that Latin Americans from various countries have received military training as well as political indoctrination in Cuba after participating in these events. Also frequently reported are instances where representatives of various Latin American Communist and pro-Communist organizations who are sent to Sino-Soviet Bloc countries for training spend a period of time in Cuba on the outward or the homeward leg of their journeys.

39. A major effort to overthrow a Latin American government was the attempt in June 1959 to oust the unpopular Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. In this case the Cubans underestimated the strength of the Dominican regime. The two forces which landed in the Dominican Republic from Cuba--one by air and the other by sea--were trained and armed in Cuba and led into battle by officers of Castro's army. The group that landed on the Dominican Coast was escorted there by units of the Cuban Navy. The invading forces, primarily composed of Dominican exiles, included a heavy sprinkling of Communists.

40. The abortive "invasions" of Panama in April 1959 and of Haiti in August of the same year were by small groups from Cuba who evidently did not have high-level Cuban official support but in the

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Panamanian case, at least, the expedition's preparations and departure probably took place with the knowledge and approval of some Cuban authorities. Of the numerous rebel raids into Nicaragua, a few were equipped with weapons from Cuba and led by Nicaraguans who had sought Cuban support for their adventures. However, none of these efforts is believed to have been directed or fully supported by Cuba. In fact, Cuban leaders are known to have had difficulty with the highly factionalized Nicaraguan exile groups that had sought support in Cuba. The Cubans had difficulties in deciding on a "trustworthy" Nicaraguan group which at the same time had any significant revolutionary capability. Several Nicaraguan, as well as at least one Panamanian and one Haitian exile group, have been jailed in Cuba as they were preparing "invasions," evidently either because they were considered the "wrong" exiles or because their chances of success were estimated to be nil.

41. There is evidence that Cuban officials estimate that Guatemala may be a country now ripe for revolution and that they have therefore decided on a program of support for the Guatemalan Communist and pro-Communist revolutionaries. A usually reliable source with high level contacts in the Cuban government reports that "Che" Guevara has offered arms and money to the Guatemalan Communist party and to a Communist-influenced Guatemalan revolutionary group on the condition that the Guatemalan Communists have the principal directing role in the revolution. Ex-president Arbenz of Guatemala and former Guatemalan Communist leaders Fortuny and Pellecer are in Cuba and probably will be utilized in the Cuban plans.

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In the case of Guatemala, as with other Latin American countries, the Cubans maintain that a genuine revolution can be achieved only after the regular armed forces are destroyed and the "masses" are armed, as in Cuba. In his frequent speeches in Cuba, Arbenz has repeatedly said that his greatest mistake was in not arming the people--an omission which permitted the "militarists," bought with "imperialist money," eventually to seize power and destroy the revolution.

42. The government of Venezuelan President Betancourt, now under heavy domestic pressure from strong Communist and pro-Castro political forces, is another target for Cuban subversive action. Leftist Venezuelan deputy Fabricio Ojeda, who has spent considerable time in Cuba in recent months, is reported to have secured official Cuban support for an armed revolt in Venezuela.

43. Castro agents, of both Cuban and foreign nationality, are traveling from Cuba to Latin American countries to promote revolutionary activities. Their objectives range from courier missions to organizing of student, labor, and revolutionary groups and the carrying out of sabotage missions. Hector ALDAMA Acosta, head of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico, is charged with the coordination of all revolutionary activities in Central America. The use of Cuban ambassadors to control these activities has been proven in a number of Latin American countries.

44. Intensive Cuban propaganda is furthered by Cuban diplomatic missions which in numerous cases, such as in Bolivia, Honduras, Panama, and El Salvador, have provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial support.

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Numerous reports connect the Cuban embassy in most Latin American countries with the distribution of anti-US and pro-Castro propaganda and financial support to local "Friends of Cuba" societies and leftist organizations.

45. The Cuban revolutionary line is also spread throughout Latin America through the facilities of the Castro-subsidized international news agency Prensa Latina, which has close working ties with the news agencies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This propaganda organization which has offices established in nearly every Latin American country disseminates the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping throughout Latin America. It frequently has distorted news stories so as to reflect unfavorably on the local government--a course which has evoked protests from the officials of several Latin American countries, including Mexico and Costa Rica.

46. The activities of Castro agents throughout the hemisphere have frequently resulted in countermeasures being taken by security and diplomatic authorities in many Latin American countries. In a number of cases, blatant attempts to undermine the sovereign rights of other Latin American governments have resulted in the arrest of pro-Castro agents and the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel.

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III.

A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS SINCE 1 JANUARY 1959

1 January 1959

Following the complete collapse of the Batista government, the Castro rebel movement moved quickly to seize control of the country. Rebel columns were reported to be marching toward Havana, where Castro sympathizers were attempting to restore order as rioters roamed the streets looting and burning. Armed militia of the 26th of July Movement were on the streets of Havana before noon and were rapidly successful in occupying or neutralizing all military strong points throughout the city. The authority of the 26th of July Movement was never seriously challenged.

2 January 1959

A provisional government was proclaimed by Fidel Castro, whose hand-picked choice for the presidency was Manuel Urrutia. In a speech in Santiago de Cuba, Castro said that he had no political ambitions and that his aims had been largely accomplished. He also declared that the army would be subordinated to civilians, it would not be required to fulfill police functions, and the 26th of July Movement militia might be retained in some form of reserve status.

5 January 1959

Venezuela became the first nation to recognize the new Cuban government. Provisional President Urrutia's inaugural speech contained references to the people of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Paraguay "who are still to be liberated."

8 January 1959

Fidel Castro arrived in Havana after a triumphal march from the opposition end of the island. Numerous decisions on governmental policy, on military reorganization, and on other matters had awaited his arrival.

10 January 1959

The Soviet Union announced its official recognition of the Castro government.

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11 January 1959

Arms were reliably reported to have been offered by the new Cuban government to Paraguayan Liberal party exiles in Uruguay. [REDACTED]

24 January 1959

During a visit to Venezuela, Fidel Castro called for the "liberation" of Puerto Rico from the United States and claimed that "international monopolies" were already campaigning to discredit the Cuban revolution. In several speeches made during his 23-27 January visit, Castro repeatedly urged unity against the regimes in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. He referred to the Organization of American States as a worthless organization. [REDACTED]

9-13 February 1959

During a special conference in Moscow of Latin American Communist parties prior to the opening of the 21st congress of the CPSU, the Cuban party was warned that the Castro regime may "go to the right" just like Nasser. It was agreed, however, that Fidel Castro and certain other Latin American leaders should be used to help organize front conferences in Latin America in which the Communist hand would be concealed. [REDACTED]

February-March 1959

Mao Tse-tung told Latin American delegates to the 21st party congress who had traveled to China after the congress that the Cuban revolution had shown that "the battle could be carried to the imperialists' rear" and that the imperialists were "paper tigers." He pointed out, however, that armed action on the Cuban model should not be applied mechanically; Latin American Communist parties should try legal, peaceful means first. [REDACTED]

16 February 1959

Fidel Castro assumed the office of prime minister following the 13 February resignation of Jose Miro Cardona, a widely respected moderate. Castro again stated that he respected the hierarchy, had no personal ambitions, and held firm democratic convictions. [REDACTED]

16 February 1959

Raul Roa, Cuban ambassador to the OAS, announced that Cuba would withdraw from that organization unless the representatives of "dictatorships" were expelled. He singled out the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Paraguay as specific targets.

19 February 1959

A representative of the Popular Socialist (Communist) party of Cuba asked the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan Communist parties to send delegates to Cuba for meetings later in the month with other Latin American Communist leaders, according to a usually reliable source. The "excellent" position of the party in Cuba, its efforts to influence the Castro government, and plans for the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government were to be discussed.

24 February 1959

"Che" Guevara reportedly told leaders of a pro-Communist Nicaraguan exile group that he was unwilling to support the efforts of a rival non-Communist anti-Somoza group and that leaders of the pro-Communist group would get the support of the Cuban government if they drafted an acceptable socio-economic program embodying "progressive ideas."

February 1959

A Cuban arms purchasing mission contracted from Fabrique Nacional in Liege, Belgium, for the following equipment, which was delivered to Cuba over a period beginning in March 1959 and ending about July 1960:

- 25,000 FAL rifles, 7.62 cal (standard NATO type)
- 52,000,000 cartridges for above rifles
- 105,000 anti-personnel grenades
- 2,500 grenade launchers
- 1,000 Belgium machine guns, 7.62 cal
- 500 UZI (Pat. Israel) made in Belgium submachine guns
- 3,000 9mm pistols

Total value of the Belgian contract, according to a Belgian Senate report, was \$7,151,300.

17 March 1959

The establishment of a new General Staff section in the Cuban Army was reported by a previously reliable source. The new section, entitled G-6 or "direction of culture," was to be headed by Osmany Cienfuegos, an officer with a proven Communist background. Personnel of the new section were reportedly re-writing text books for military use, and they were evidently responsible for educating illiterate Cuban soldiers along Marxist lines.

18 March 1959

"Che" Guevara was reliably reported to have said that "We are going to get a Soviet ambassador here in Cuba one way or another."

22 March 1959

Fidel Castro strongly refuted former Costa Rican president Jose Figueres' pro-US speech in Havana, in which Figueres advised Cuba to follow a moderate approach to revolutionary reforms and to align itself with the West. In a sharply worded two hour speech, Castro attacked the Cuban oligarchy (wealthy classes and intellectuals), and the international oligarchy (wealthy investment interests, the wire services, and the United States in general) for their opposition to the revolution. He deplored the international situation but argued it was no reason for Cuba to sink to its knees in submission to the United States as in the past.

24 March 1959

A spokesman for Jose Figueres made it clear to Ambassador Bonsal in Havana that Figueres was returning to Costa Rica convinced that Communists were influential in the Cuban Army, labor, and government. Figueres also regarded Castro as an opponent of the leftist non-Communist revolutionary movement in Latin America. He expected serious political deterioration in Cuba, after which he felt "anything could happen," including Communist domination. He strongly suspected that a strong nucleus of dedicated Communists in Cuba were trying to create a "Hungary in reverse" requiring US armed intervention.

6 April 1959

"Che" Guevara reportedly offered Cuban aid to exiled Paraguayan rebels if the Paraguayan Communist party were included in a united front and if the united front members signed a commitment to legalize the Communist party after the Stroessner regime had been ousted.

18 April 1959

[REDACTED] to the Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC) requested confirmation of the receipt of an invitation for the Cubans to send a delegation of workers to the Soviet Union to celebrate May Day, and it informed the CTC that it was unable to accept an invitation to send delegates to Cuba for an unspecified event on 22 April. [REDACTED]

23 April 1959

Two Chinese Communist newsmen, representatives of Peiping's New China News Agency, arrived in Havana. Subsequent reports indicate the two men established a Havana office of the news agency, which was housed in the same building as was used by Prensa Latina, Castro's official propaganda agency, after its formal establishment on 9 June. [REDACTED]

24 April 1959

A permanent Special Mission in Europe was created by Cuban law for the purpose of "technical studies concerning the most modern procedures for the manufacture of material of war, and the acquisition of same." The Mission, with offices in Paris, was entrusted to Col. Ramon Barquin, an anti-Batista officer of high professional reputation and reportedly a thorn in the side of the top command of the new revolutionary army, who wished Barquin removed from the local scene. [REDACTED]

25 April 1959

A group of 87 persons, all but four of whom were Cubans, invaded Panama by sea. Information developed and released by the Panamanian government disclosed that the expedition departed by ship from the Cuban southern coast port of Surgidero de Batabano on 16 April. Although Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and Foreign Minister Agramonte denied complicity in the plan on the part of the Cuban government, the expedition's preparations and departure probably took place with the knowledge and approval of some Cuban authorities. [REDACTED]

25 April 1959

Major Raul Castro, commander in chief of the Cuban armed forces, reportedly began a major purge of the Cuban military. Plans were said

[REDACTED]

to include the eventual elimination of all officers Raul considered as rightists and unsympathetic to him. Besides shifts in the general staff, other projected changes were reported to include the removal of all majors and perhaps lower ranking officers affiliated with the Revolutionary Directorate, a rebel organization which fought Batista independently of the Castro group. [REDACTED]

1 May 1959

Speakers at Cuba's largest May Day rally in history stressed (1) the need for unity of all classes and political beliefs in support of the revolution; (2) the revolution first and elections afterward; and (3) military training for the workers to enable them to serve as a militia in defense of the revolution. To emphasize the third point, a group of men and women bearing rifles marched in the Havana parade. The Popular Socialist (Communist) party had already publicly advocated the idea of a militia when, on 30 April, the chief of the Cuban Confederation of Workers issued a long, emotional May Day statement strongly favoring a workers' militia. [REDACTED]

8 May 1959

A three-man delegation representing the USSR's Central Council of Trade Unions arrived in Cuba following a delay in Paris over visa difficulties which prevented them from being in Cuba for the May Day ceremonies. In an interview granted to the representatives of the Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy, the Russians declared they knew that the Soviet government favored the establishment of trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba. [REDACTED]

14 May 1959

[REDACTED]

Newspapers reported the construction of two air strips in Cuba at Sopillar, Cienaga de Zapata, Las Villas Province--one with a 3,936-foot runway and the other with a 2,624-foot runway. The air strips were reported still under construction at this time. Papers also reported the purchase of one helicopter from an undisclosed seller to be used for the transportation of personnel to and from the Cienaga de Zapata swamp.

[REDACTED]

22 May 1959

During an interview granted to a group from the US National War College, Fidel Castro acknowledged that there were some 35,000¹ men in the Revolutionary Army at the time. This figure was gradually being reduced through discharges, separations, and retirements.

[REDACTED]

25 May 1959

The Table of Organization and Equipment of the Revolutionary Army indicated an overall figure of 24,828 men for the organization. The total figure for the Rural Revolutionary Police was given as 9628 men (not included in the army figure).

[REDACTED]

11 June 1959

According to a Nicaraguan rebel emissary sent to Cuba, Castro promised \$100,000 to \$150,000 and "a large number of Cuban troops to fight in Nicaragua." The US Embassy in Havana declared it had become convinced that the Cuban government was supporting revolutionary expeditions against the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.

[REDACTED]

14 June 1959

An armed expedition landed in the Dominican Republic, and members who were subsequently captured told Dominicans that they had been flown there from Cuba and that two boat loads of additional forces had left Cuba for the Dominican Republic. Subsequent evidence inferred that the rebels counted with the acquiescence, if not the direct cooperation, of Cuban government officials.

[REDACTED]

15 June 1959

Upon the assumption of the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raul Roa told a press conference that reports of Cuban involvement in armed incursions in Nicaragua were "international intrigue" to create problems for the Cuban revolution. He added that "Cuba will not permit itself to be used as a base of departure for expeditions against other countries but it will receive all those who demand the right to be free in their own country." [REDACTED]

18 June 1959

A drastic air force purge which resulted in the dismissal of most of the force's rated pilots was made public on 18 June. Armed forces chief Raul Castro was responsible for the purge, which also resulted in the replacement of Major Pedro Diaz Lanz as air force chief. Diaz Lanz was known to have been particularly concerned about the Communist influence in military schools that were giving six-week courses in political indoctrination to many Cuban military personnel. [REDACTED]

28 June 1959

Revolutionary army chief Camilo Cienfuegos declared in a speech to a military group that the Cuban Army should be ready to assist other rebel groups in the hemisphere once victory had been gained. He said that when the dictators have been defeated, Cuba would like to send trained men to these countries to assist the new governments in organizing "The Army of the people, the Army of all America, this Army of workers that will soon exist as in other lands." [REDACTED]

4 July 1959

Four Chinese Communist newsmen arrived in Havana from Brazil after having been refused entry in Venezuela. Their Cuban assignment was to report on the Cuban revolution, and especially on the newly instituted agrarian reform, according to the local Communist newspaper. Their arrival brought the number of Communist Chinese journalists known to be in Cuba to eight, six of whom were generally known and two who were active but received no publicity. [REDACTED]

7 July 1959

A delegation of Cuban naval officers left for England, Germany, and France in an attempt to purchase 15 high-speed Coast Guard craft, three motor torpedo boats, and two buoy tenders after \$9,900,000 had been budgeted for these purchases. Cuban purchasing commissions are still vainly trying to purchase the craft, having met no success in earlier negotiations. [REDACTED]

13 July 1959

A permanent Czechoslovakian commercial mission to Cuba was established with the arrival of a Czech commercial attache from the Czech legation in Mexico City. Preliminary talks with Cuban officials were held to discuss the possibility of Cuba's purchasing Czech construction equipment and tractors. Later discussions on Czech desires for a barter arrangement involving Cuban exports of minerals to Czechoslovakia in exchange for Czech products and technical assistance to the Cuban mining industry were suspended. [REDACTED]

20 July 1959

Armed forces chief Raul Castro presided at the inauguration of a political indoctrination school for the military and predicted that this and similar schools would "coordinate ideas" so that all good revolutionaries would "think alike." Two other political indoctrination schools were established during the same week. [REDACTED]

29 July 1959

Foreign minister Raul Roa in a speech on 29 July stated that the Cuban revolution was serving as a base for the future union of all Latin American countries. [REDACTED]

7 August 1959

A reliable source reported on this date that the Revolutionary Air Force had recently received a shipment of spare parts for Cuba's British-made Sea Fury fighter planes, the shipment arriving from England via Curacao. [REDACTED]

7 August 1959

Soviet Premier Khrushchev was invited to visit Havana. The invitation was extended [REDACTED] by the pro-Castro newspaper Diario Libre. [REDACTED]

22 August 1959

[REDACTED]

Raul Castro, arriving in Havana along with the returning Cuban delegation to the foreign ministers' meeting in Santiago de Chile, was quoted as saying that the OAS was a "worthless organization". [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7 September 1959

In a Havana speech the Cuban Under Secretary of State spoke of the formulation of a new foreign policy by the revolutionary government since coming into power. He described it as an "aggressive policy" based on "the defense of our patrimony, of our interests, and of our positions." He indicated that the Ministry of State was being reorganized and that one of the new departments would deal with the Latin American area, since "while our message is universal, it has to start out by being American." He also said that Cuba would follow an aggressive economic policy "to buy where we can sell."

[REDACTED]

11 September 1959

Raul Castro delivered a speech before the semi-official cultural organization "Casa de las Americas" on the subject of "The Message of the Cuban Revolution." He asserted that the Cuban revolution has had a profound effect throughout Latin America; that Cuba does not export its revolution through expeditions but it could not remain indifferent before the tyrannies existing in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Paraguay; he ascribed leadership to Cuba in the economic and political emancipation of Latin America; and he endorsed the idea of holding a Latin American Youth Congress and a Congress of Latin American Peoples. The holding of a Latin American peoples' congress was a fundamental stratagem decided upon by Latin American Communist delegates to the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist party early in 1959.

[REDACTED]

24 September 1959

At a press conference, Cuban army commander Camilo Cienfuegos explained that an apparent military alert of the previous few days was in reality one of a series of measures taken to identify and punish persons falsely claiming to be members of the armed forces and members who were guilty of a "lack of discipline and violation of standing orders." Cienfuegos added that the current strength of the Cuban armed force totaled about 38,000 persons, but this figure would be reduced as much as possible in order to create a small, highly skilled and disciplined army. [REDACTED]

24 September 1959

A law abolishing the secret police was passed, evidently in accordance with plans of Raul Castro to ensure that all police and investigative forces would be under his command in law as well as in fact. The move followed the dissolution of the comparatively efficient marine corps, which was only one of Raul's moves to reduce the professional status and political independence of the Cuban Navy. [REDACTED]

13 October 1959

Cuban Minister of Commerce Raul Cepero Bonilla noted during an appearance on a television program that in the preceding five years the USSR had purchased 260 million pesos worth of sugar without any corresponding purchase of USSR products by Cuba. While these commercial relations continued to exist, he said, Cuba did not contemplate the initiation of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

16 October 1959

[REDACTED] that Prague was negotiating for the sale of aircraft and "other things" to Cuba. The personalities involved suggested that light aircraft and paramilitary equipment were under discussion. [REDACTED]

16 October 1959

It was announced following a cabinet meeting that the Cuban Ministry of National Defense had been abolished and a new Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces established in its place. Raul Castro was named as chief of the new ministry, which assumed direct control over all army, navy, air, and police forces. [REDACTED]

22 October 1959

Fidel Castro, during a four and one half hour television appearance, said that the government would arm the peasants and workers to defend the revolution against attacks like those of 21 October, when small planes based in the United States had allegedly "bombed" Havana. [REDACTED] In a press statement issued on 24 October, the Secretary General of the National Confederation of Sugar Workers announced that orders had been sent to all constituent unions to begin at once their organization of military training for all members in accordance with Prime Minister Castro's recommendations on 22 October. [REDACTED]

26 October 1959

Complaining against American efforts to prevent Cuba from obtaining jet planes from England, Fidel Castro initiated a popular drive to collect money from the public to buy aircraft to defend Cuba during the course of a mass meeting in Havana. Castro contributed a check of his own to this fund drive, and numerous government agencies and private enterprises followed suit. By 2 November it was announced that there was a total of \$34,568.17 in the fund. [REDACTED]

3 November 1959

The newspaper Revolucion, the official daily of Castro's 26th of July Movement, advocated that Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan, who was to inaugurate the Soviet exhibition in Mexico on 22 November, be invited to visit Cuba as a prelude to the resumption of diplomatic relations and to expand trade between Cuban and the USSR. [REDACTED]

4 November 1959

President Betancourt of Venezuela criticized signs of Castro's "authoritarian rule" and told the Cuban government that a proposed visit to Venezuela by Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara would be "inconvenient." [REDACTED] Betancourt personally demanded the recall of the Cuban ambassador in Caracas [REDACTED]

12 November 1959

A Cuban arms purchasing mission canvassing Western Europe was reported en route to Prague to investigate possible acquisitions of jet aircraft and other arms. No results of this mission were ever disclosed. [REDACTED]

13 November 1959

Newly formed brigades of student militia from Havana University, armed with 100 rifles allegedly furnished by the army and led by student federation leader Major Rolando Cubela, passed in review before armed forces minister Raul Castro. [REDACTED]

17 November 1959

According to an official of the UAR foreign ministry, Cuban authorities told the UAR foreign minister that Cuba had decided to strengthen its army, and they requested samples of weapons then being used by UAR armed forces, both Soviet and locally made. [REDACTED]

25 November 1959

Negotiations were in progress for Czechoslovakia to sell thirteen trucks to the Cuban Defense Ministry. [REDACTED]

27 November 1959

A total of 500 students armed with rifles borrowed from the army paraded through Havana in connection with the observance of "Students' Day." The US embassy commented that the student militia was evidently progressing more quickly than the efforts to form a workers' militia and a farmers' militia. At this date there was no apparent direction or organization in the establishment of militia groups. [REDACTED]

10 December 1959

The Havana press carried the text of an exclusive UPI interview with Cuban foreign minister Raul Roa at the United Nations, in which Roa disclosed that Fidel Castro had called a "Conference of Underdeveloped Nations" to be held in Havana in mid-1960. 28 Afro-Asian nations and "some" Latin American countries would attend. Despite an intense Cuban campaign to line up firm commitments from these nations to attend--a campaign which persisted until the summer of 1960--the Cuban government was forced to abandon or at least postpone the conference because of its failure to obtain more than tentative acceptances from only a few countries. [REDACTED]

10 December 1959

Moscow radio said that the Soviet technical and cultural exhibit appearing in Mexico City at the time would open in Havana on 5 February 1960. [REDACTED]

14 December 1959

Paraguayan officials in Asuncion were informed that 300 machine guns and 800 rifles were about to be shipped to Buenos Aires under orders from Raul Castro for the use of Paraguayan rebels against the Stroessner regime. [REDACTED]

31 December 1959

The first shipment of arms and ammunition bought from Italy under terms of an agreement concluded in July arrived in Havana aboard an Italian vessel. Equipment estimated to be worth some \$2,500,000 was furnished to Cuba under the agreement. It included:

- 72 81 mm mortars and 40,000 mortar shells
- 16 120 mm mortars and 8,000 shells
- 12 105 mm howitzers and 16,000 105 mm shells
- 50 machineguns
- 70 rocket launchers and 8,000 rockets
- 7 flamethrowers
- 1,500,000 50 cal. cartridges
- Miscellaneous communications equipment [REDACTED]

31 December 1959

The Castro government signed its first trade agreement with Communist China, under the terms of which Cuba agreed to sell 50,000 tons of sugar to Peiping at a price below the world market price. [REDACTED]

1 January 1960

The first contingent of men and women members of the Havana University student militia left Havana for a two-week training period in the Sierra Maestra. They were accompanied by Fidel Castro. This was the first militia group to obtain field training, following which the members were to act as instructors for new units. [REDACTED]

7 January 1960

A Cuban returning from a tour of Communist China told Raul Castro that the Chinese Communist foreign minister asked him to tell Raul that 20 industrial and agricultural technicians already promised would arrive in Cuba during January. [REDACTED]

9 January 1960

The Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces designated Captain Rogelio Acevedo Gonzalez as national chief of the "Revolutionary Militias." At the same time instructions were issued to the chiefs of all four military services that they were to facilitate the

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military training of all civilians who
asked for it. ██████████

12 January 1960

Organization and direction of the revolution-
ary militia by the Cuban government became
more complete with the publication of new
regulations governing the militia groups.
The following regulations were instituted:
(1) all militia groups were given 30 days in
which to register with the government; (2)
each militiaman was instructed to file bio-
graphic data forms and photos with the head
of his group; (3) each militia instructor
had to obtain a certificate within 30 days
authorizing him to do such work; and (4)
militia groups unable to comply with these
and other minor regulations had to suspend
activities until the new edicts had been
met. ██████████

4 February 1960

Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan arrived in
Havana at the head of a 41-person delegation
heavily weighted with specialists connected
with foreign trade, although the ostensible
reason for Mikoyan's trip to Havana was to
officiate at the opening of the Soviet ex-
hibit there. The Cuban-Soviet economic
agreement which emerged from Mikoyan's con-
versation with Cuban leaders was signed on
13 February. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, the USSR agreed to purchase one million
tons of Cuban sugar annually from 1960 through
1964 at the world market price rate. 20
percent of this volume was to be paid in
cash and the balance by exports of Soviet
goods to Cuba. An economic aid agreement
was also signed under which the USSR extended
a \$100 million credit to Cuba for the pur-
chase of machinery and materials and agreed
to furnish technical assistance to Cuba during
the five-year period of the credit. At a
reception in Havana on 12 February, Mikoyan,
in answer to a question, said that Cuba would
sell military aircraft to Cuba if requested,
but he implied that there had been no mention
of Cuban arms purchases from the USSR in
the talks. Later, in Moscow, he dismissed
this subject by saying the sale of aircraft
to Cuba had not been discussed and pointed
out that Cuba needed tractors and plows, not
military planes. He reiterated, however,
that "we are willing to sell fighter planes
to anyone." ██████████

9 February 1960

The Mexican ambassador to Prague claimed he had definite information to the effect that three Cubans had recently arrived in Prague in order to purchase Czech munitions for Cuba. [REDACTED]

3 March 1960

Cuban national bank president "Che" Guevara and the director of the East German State Bank signed a one-year trade and payments agreement. East Germany agreed to purchase 60,000 tons of sugar at the world market price. The pact reportedly took the unaccustomed form of an inter-bank agreement in order to avoid risking Cuban commercial ties with the West German government. [REDACTED]

4 March 1960

The French cargo vessel "La Coubre" carrying 76 tons of ammunition bought by Cuba in Belgium blew up in Havana harbor. Within a matter of hours after the explosion Cuban government spokesmen attributed the disaster to US-directed sabotage. [REDACTED]

13 March 1960

In a speech at Havana University Fidel Castro referred to a "yankee paper which in days past said that we had spent I don't know how many millions on arms." Although Castro acknowledged that the government had indeed been procuring the weapons "necessary for its defense," he gave no figures and no description of the types of arms acquired. He took the position that it was nobody's business what arms Cuba acquired since they were exclusively for self defense. He indicated that the watchword of the revolution was "work and rifle" and said the people must work to carry forward the revolutionary program and at the same time be prepared to shoulder a rifle to repel the aggressor in the event of an attack. [REDACTED]

16 March 1960

The Ecuadoran [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] government
to exercise close surveillance over all Cuban visitors to Ecuador. Cuban Communists and the Cuban government were rumored to be giving financial aid to various leftist groups in Ecuador to support leftist candidates in the imminent national election. [REDACTED]

18 March 1960

A press report stated that Cuba would buy 12 Mi-4 helicopters from the USSR "for irrigation and fumigation work." One of these was on display at the Soviet exposition and was left in Cuba. Castro noted that only the day before the United States had revoked export licenses for the sale of four similar helicopters to Cuba. [REDACTED]

21 March 1960

[REDACTED] that a Cuban government official would shortly arrive in Cairo to purchase some 23 obsolescent British-made jet fighters, numerous trainers, and ammunition for all the planes--material made available to the Castro government in February. There has been no indication since this date that Cuba has received any military equipment from the UAR. [REDACTED]

24 March 1960

A fairly reliable source with good government contacts reported that in case of a possible internal conflict, Fidel Castro's strategy would be to rely heavily on the civil militia in the cities and to use the Cuban army mostly for guerrilla-type warfare in rural areas and in the mountains. An untested source reported in this connection that the government had begun an intensive arms distribution and caching program in anticipation of such a conflict. [REDACTED]

26 March 1960

Communists or pro-Communists from 15 Latin American countries attended the closing ceremonies of the "Week of Solidarity with the Struggle of the Latin American Peoples" --proclaimed by the Communist-infiltrated labor arm of the Castro regime and backed by the Cuban Communist party--and issued a manifesto calling for the initiation of an "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution in all Latin America." A Cuban labor leader announced plans at the same time for a "great Latin American congress to create the apparatus to fight the common enemy... imperialism." He said Cuban delegations would leave on 1 May for other Latin American countries "to give them help and to request aid for the Cuban revolution." Many of the week's manifestations stressed the "unfortunate plight" of Puerto Rico, "still under the bondage of the common enemy." [REDACTED]

31 March 1960

Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and the Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade signed a trade and payments agreement, a technical cooperation agreement, and a credit agreement for Cuban purchases of Polish industrial equipment. According to subsequent reports, there were no provisions for supplying military aircraft or arms to Cuba under the terms of the agreement.

[REDACTED]

4 April 1960

The Fourth National Congress of the youth section of the Cuban Communist party opened in Havana and was attended by delegates from the Soviet Union, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and a number of other Soviet bloc countries in addition to those from other Latin American countries. The congress, which lasted a week, opened with a rally broadcast over the government-operated radio and television networks.

[REDACTED]

6 April 1960

[REDACTED] agreement for Dr. Vladimir Pavlicek as Czech ambassador in Havana. An announcement of the elevation of Cuban-Czech relations to the embassy level was made in Havana on 17 May.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

28 April 1960

President Ydigoras of Guatemala announced a rupture of relations with Cuba for complicity with elements in Guatemala planning to overthrow his government.

[REDACTED]

1 May 1960

Revolutionary army units participating in the May Day parade in Havana consisted of an armored serial composed of Sherman and Comet medium tanks plus armored cars and light tanks; an artillery serial

of 75 mm Pack howitzers, 25 mm Hotchkiss antiaircraft guns and four unidentified truck-drawn artillery pieces; and an infantry serial of five three-company battalions. All infantrymen parading carried Belgian FN 7.62 automatic rifles. These detachments were followed by the University, Peasant, Women's, and Workers' Militias. [REDACTED]

4 May 1960

A Brazilian Communist reported that a school for Latin American Communists had been established in Communist China in April, offering a six-month course in military strategy and agrarian reform. Among the students reported to be attending the school were 30 Cubans. [REDACTED]

7 May 1960

The Cuban Foreign Office announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union at the embassy level. Soviet ambassador to Havana Sergey Kudryavtsev arrived in Cuba in mid-August, and Cuban ambassador to Moscow Faure Chaumont arrived there in early September. [REDACTED]

11 May 1960

[REDACTED] provided the first reliable evidence that the bloc was preparing to supply military equipment to the Castro regime. The head of the Chief Technical Directorate of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Technical Directorate is responsible for Czech exports of military equipment and is involved in many of the bloc's arms deals with nonbloc countries. Subsequent deliveries of bloc arms to Cuba probably were arranged as a result of Cuban negotiations with the Czech Technical Directorate during May and June 1960. [REDACTED]

22 May 1960

80 Russians arrived in Cuba on 22 May to join the Soviet Trade Commission established during Mikoyan's visit in February, according to information considered reliable by the US service attaches in Havana. Caracas newspapers during the week reported that groups of Russians and [REDACTED]

Czechs had recently been passing through Venezuela en route to Havana by several airlines. Their documents described them as mechanics, technicians, and experts in varying fields, and a "diplomatic mission of technical assistance."

22 May 1960

According to a Cuban government official, crates of Cuban and Soviet Communist propaganda material were placed on the plane which was used by Cuban president Osvaldo Dorticos in his 22 May - 14 June tour of six Latin American countries. The propaganda material allegedly was delivered to the Cuban embassy in each country on the Dorticos itinerary. Subsequent reports indicate that Cuban embassies in most Latin American countries have covertly received varying amounts of Cuban propaganda for local distribution.

31 May 1960

A reliable source of the US Army attache in Havana stated that the only Soviet advisors with the Cuban Air Force at that time were the four technicians left with the helicopter the USSR presented to Cuba in February. The source had been told that Soviet fighters would be delivered in June or July, accompanied by Soviet pilots and technicians.

31 May 1960

Another Cuban arms purchasing mission visited the bloc, including the USSR, Communist China, and Czechoslovakia. The only reported result was a contract to purchase an unspecified number of Soviet helicopters for the Cuban armed forces.

1 June 1960

The Nicaraguan government cabled the Cuban foreign ministry demanding the recall of the Cuban ambassador and his entire staff for having repeatedly engaged in subversive activities.

10 June 1960

Czechoslovakia extended a \$20,000,000 credit for industrial development to Cuba. A technical assistance agreement and a five-year trade pact between the two countries were also signed.

17 June 1960

[REDACTED]
The Cuban government announced that Poland had accepted the Cuban candidate for ambassador to Warsaw. Relations between the two countries at the embassy level were formally announced on 3 September in Havana. [REDACTED]

20 June 1960

An eight-man Cuban mission reportedly departed for Czechoslovakia to be trained in artillery methods for two or three months. The report stated that all Cuban artillery purchases were now to be made in Czechoslovakia. [REDACTED]

25 June 1960

Cuban Minister of Armed Forces Raul Castro left for a visit to Prague, accompanied by a number of Cuban military officers and government officials. It is likely that an agreement for Czechoslovakia to supply arms to Cuba was concluded at this time. [REDACTED]

28 June 1960

The Soviet merchant vessel Baltiysk arrived in Havana touching off a spate of rumors on the delivery of Soviet arms to Cuba. The rumors ran from small arms to rockets and missiles, with nuclear weapons mentioned in at least one report. While it is possible that some arms were delivered aboard the Baltiysk, the bulk of its cargo consisted of fertilizers and cement. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After the arrival of the Baltiysk, every Soviet vessel which called at a Cuban port with incoming cargo produced reports of possible arms deliveries. [REDACTED]

4 July 1960

According to an untested Cuban government official, the Cuban embassy in Bern was in the process of issuing visas to a group of 30 Communist Chinese nationals--including three military officers--who planned to travel to Cuba for "commercial" purposes. The Bern embassy reportedly had standing instructions to honor all Soviet and Communist Chinese visa requests without consulting Havana beforehand. [REDACTED]

7 July 1960

The Soviet vessel Zhan Zhores delivered four Mi-4 helicopters to Cuba, which were then taken to the Playa Baracoa airbase near Havana to be assembled by Soviet and/or Czech technicians. This ship may have carried additional military equipment such as rifles, machine guns and ammunition, which later was turned over to the Cuban militia. A report from the US Army attache in Havan on 30 July said that a recent delivery of bloc arms had included 10,000 rifles with folding bayonets, 10,000 submachine guns and 30 "cannon." This equipment may have been delivered from the Zhan Zhores.

9 July 1960

[REDACTED] a group of Czech technicians was [REDACTED] at The Playa Baracoa airbase. Although the type of work was not specified it is likely that the assembly of Mi-4 helicopters or other military equipment was involved. [REDACTED] unspecified items for Cuba from the Czech Technical Directorate which deals in military and military-related goods. [REDACTED]

9 July 1960

In a speech to the All-Union Conference of Teachers at Moscow Soviet Premier Khrushchev said: "Figuratively speaking, Soviet artillerists, in the event of necessity, can with their rocket firepower support the Cuban people if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare begin intervention against Cuba....recent tests have shown, we have rockets capable of striking accurately in a set square at a distance of 30,000 kilometers." When asked later the same day by US correspondents to clarify his earlier remarks, Khrushchev refused but sent a note saying the USSR would not remain indifferent in such a situation. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs press chief was reported as saying the remarks were hypothetical and applied to a hypothetical situation; thus no clarification was appropriate. [REDACTED]

12 July 1960

[REDACTED]

In regard to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Khrushchev said at his 12 July press conference that the Cuban people would in time have their say. "They will say 'it is enough. You have plundered sufficiently. Now get out!' If at that time the United States intervenes militarily we will lend Cuba our support," he said. [REDACTED]

15 July 1960

Belgian government officials informed the US embassy in Brussels that Belgium would issue no more export licenses for the sale of arms to Cuba. [REDACTED]

16 July 1960

Aerial and ground reconnaissance by the US military attaches in Cuba failed to reveal evidence of MIG aircraft or unusual construction activities which had been mentioned in numerous reports. [REDACTED]

18 July 1960

Several sources reported that the former foreign minister of Argentina under Peron was negotiating with the Cuban government concerning cooperation with the Peronistas and Communists in Argentina for the overthrow of President Frondizi. Argentine-born "Che" Guevara, Cuba's economic czar, reportedly consulted with the ex-foreign minister on three occasions. [REDACTED]

19 July 1960

Soviet delegate Sobolev, in the debate in the Security Council on Cuban charges against the US, denounced the US' alleged "economic aggression" against Cuba and its campaign of "hostile agitations and slander." He denied that the USSR had any use for bases in Cuba or elsewhere since weapons based on its own soil could reach "any target." "If armed aggression were undertaken against Cuba," he said, the USSR "could not remain indifferent" and would assist Cuba with all its military might, if Cuba so requested. [REDACTED]

21 July 1960

The joint Soviet-Cuban communique issued after Raul Castro's interview with Khrushchev in Moscow on 18 July asserted that the Soviet Union would "use every means to prevent US armed intervention against Cuba. The communique then minimized the likelihood of such US intervention."

intervention by saying that the US statement disavowing any intention of such a move was a commitment assumed before the entire world. While the communique makes it clear that the US statement was issued after Khrushchev's threat, it refrains from claiming credit for it, even by implication. [REDACTED]

21 July 1960

A Cuban plane departed Havana for Prague to meet Raul Castro. The plane's passenger manifest revealed that 65 passengers were aboard, including several high-level military officers. Most of the passengers are believed to have been trainees sent to Czechoslovakia for military instruction. [REDACTED]

23 July 1960

The governments of Cuba and Communist China signed a trade and payment agreement--providing for Peiping's purchase of 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar annually for a five-year period--an agreement on scientific and cultural cooperation, and an agreement on cultural cooperation. [REDACTED]

26 July 1960

In his letter of congratulations to Fidel Castro on the seventh anniversary of the 26th of July Movement, Khrushchev declared that the Cuban people are not alone in their struggle, and he pledged that the Soviet Union would give Cuba "the necessary support" in case of armed intervention. [REDACTED]

26 July 1960

The long-planned Latin American Youth Congress, attended by delegates from most Latin American countries as well as by "fraternal delegates" from most Sino-Soviet bloc nations, opened in the Sierra Maestra. Proceedings of the congress, which closed on 7 August, featured expressions of support for the Cuban revolution and denunciations of aggressions by US "imperialists" against Cuba. [REDACTED]

27 July 1960

In a statement on 27 July Castro said that "this will be the last time...the militia will parade without rifles," because the weapons were now in Cuba and would be distributed at the proper time. [REDACTED]

Probably he referred to Czech rifles which had been delivered shortly before. [REDACTED]

3 August 1960

Information from [REDACTED] and from [REDACTED] clearly indicated that shipments of Soviet-bloc arms to Cuba were being planned. The head of the Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate, Sergeichik, and the Soviet official associated with exports of military goods from the Black Sea port of Nikolaev, Yastrebov, were identified in Cuba for the first time. Their presence confirmed that high-level discussions were in progress for the delivery of bloc arms. [REDACTED]

7 August 1960

In Prime Minister Fidel Castro's speech at the closing session of the Latin American Youth Congress, he repeatedly attempted to identify Latin American workers, peasants, students, and intellectuals with the Cuban revolution and frankly appealed to the people over the heads of their governments to follow the Cuban example. He bitterly attacked the forthcoming Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the Organization of American States as tools of "American imperialism" to be used against the Cuban revolution. He also elaborated further on the subject of arming the militia: he said that arms were located in strategic places, were readily accessible for distribution to militiamen, and were in condition for immediate use. In another speech given the same day, foreign minister Raul Roa said that Cuba had taken its place in the front ranks of a world-wide revolutionary movement of greater scope and impact than the Renaissance. [REDACTED]

7 August 1960

Contingents of a so-called International Work Brigade began to arrive in Cuba in order to participate in the construction of a "school city" in the Sierra Maestra mountains of Oriente Province. "Volunteers" from a number of countries, including most Sino-Soviet bloc nations, were joined by many delegates remaining after the conclusion of the Latin American Youth Congress. Before the brigade left Cuba in early October, several

reports from brigade members stated that participants were given guerrilla training during their two month period in the Sierra Maestra. [REDACTED]

15 August 1960

In response to Khrushchev's congratulations on the anniversary of the 26th of July Movement, Fidel Castro sent a letter to Khrushchev in which he stated that Soviet "sympathy puts us under still greater obligation to follow the path we have chosen.... The breaking of the chain of imperialist oppression is of tremendous significance for the peoples of Latin America and for all oppressed peoples of the world." He added that Soviet solidarity with Cuba is "unquestionable proof that the peoples fighting for independence are not alone." [REDACTED]

16 August 1960

A New China News Agency despatch from Peiping reported that Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had offered Cuba "all possible assistance with no qualifications." [REDACTED]

16 August 1960

The Cuban Army, led by Fidel and Raul Castro, occupied the Naval Arsenal and main naval base in Casa Blanca as a result of information concerning a plot involving the defection of the three PF to the United States. Following this, the Navy was virtually deactivated, only one PCE (CARIBE) and a few YP remaining in service. Large numbers of naval personnel were sent to farm cooperatives, transferred to the merchant marine, or assigned to other non-naval tasks. [REDACTED]

16 August 1960

The eighth national congress of the Popular Socialist (Communist) party of Cuba opened in Havana with many relatively high-level foreign Communist delegations in attendance. Communist China, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Poland sent members of party central committees, and North Korea also sent delegates. The gathering provided an opportunity for international Communist liaison and for the further exploitation of Cuba as a base for operations in Latin America. [REDACTED]

18 August 1960

Another Cuban plane flew to Prague with at least 80 passengers, most of whom were probably more military trainees. [REDACTED]

21 August 1960

A photograph taken on 21 August revealed that Czech 7.62 mm semiautomatic rifles had been delivered to Cuba and were in the hands of the militia. There was no indication of the amount of Czech material which had been delivered, but probably the rifles were part of a small shipment made in July. It may have included machine guns, ammunition, and other light arms as well. At the ceremony where the picture was taken, Castro told the graduating militiamen that the people were "armed to the teeth" and soon more weapons would be received. [REDACTED]

28 August 1960

Foreign Minister Raul Roa and the Cuban delegation to the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers at San Jose, Costa Rica walked out of the meeting after failing to obtain approval of a resolution condemning the United States and failing to block the adoption of a firm resolution against Soviet bloc intervention in this hemisphere. Speeches by Roa and Fidel Castro two days later reached new heights of bitter invective against the US and against the representatives of other Latin American governments. This trend was continued when on 2 September the Castro regime summoned a "National General Assembly of the Cuban People" in Havana to repudiate the Declaration of San Jose and to counter it with a so-called "Declaration of Havana," which in effect withdrew Cuba from the inter-American system and aligned it more firmly with the Sino-Soviet bloc. [REDACTED]

28 August 1960

[REDACTED] that Czech rifles were being used by the regular army as well as the militia. [REDACTED]

29 August 1960

North Korea received its first diplomatic recognition outside the Bloc with the signing in Havana of an agreement to exchange

ambassadors with Cuba "as soon as possible." The announcement was made in a joint declaration following the signing of a cultural exchange agreement by representatives of the two countries. [REDACTED]

2 September 1960

Fidel Castro announced at the "National General Assembly of the Cuban People" that Cuba would no longer recognize Nationalist China but would establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic; that Cuba would support the admission of Communist China to the United Nations; and that Cuba would establish relations with "all the socialist countries." On 24 September the Cuban cabinet approved decrees formally establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea and Communist China at the embassy level; on 28 September Peiping and Havana issued a joint communique agreeing to exchange ambassadors as soon as possible. [REDACTED]

6 September 1960

[REDACTED] that a Cuban army private was in Czechoslovakia for military training-- [REDACTED] evidence that such training was in progress. [REDACTED]

8 September 1960

The Soviet cargo ship Ilya Mechnikov arrived in Havana with the first major shipment of bloc arms to Cuba. Its 4,000-ton cargo apparently included at least 10 medium tanks, antiaircraft artillery, machine guns, ammunition, radar and electronics equipment and other unidentified material. Detailed reports did not indicate that aircraft were delivered at that time. [REDACTED]

12 September 1960

[REDACTED] the first time that jet fuel was noted for delivery to Cuba. [REDACTED]

14 September 1960

Cuba and Hungary signed agreements on commercial relations, payments, credits, and a protocol on scientific and technical cooperation. Hungary granted Cuba a credit

[REDACTED]

of \$8 million to buy machinery and equipment especially for hydroelectric projects.

[REDACTED]

15 September 1960

In mid-September Fidel Castro told [REDACTED] that he believed capitalism and the United States were "finished," that he believed the Sino-Soviet bloc would win the present ideological struggle, and he therefore deemed it necessary to align Cuba with the Soviets. Castro also went to considerable lengths in describing himself as the rising leader of Latin America and Africa, and while indicating his concern with the attitude of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, he boasted that if the Venezuelans were not with him, he could "undermine their economy and bring them to their knees." His comments on Soviet technical assistance were enthusiastic, and he remarked that "With all these excellent people in Cuba we will defeat the corrupt capitalistic system."

[REDACTED]

16 September 1960

An aerial reconnaissance flight by the US Air attache disclosed no evidence of MIG aircraft at Cuban airbases, despite continuing reports of their presence.

[REDACTED]

18 September 1960

National Bank President Guevara talked openly at a public gathering of arming Cubans with Czech military equipment, "purchased with no strings attached." Soon, he said, there will be aircraft "of any power which sells them to us," plus tanks, cannons, bazookas, machine guns and projectiles of all types "from those who would sell them to us."

[REDACTED]

20 September 1960

According to reports from two sources, 12 Soviet technicians were engaged in some type of military construction at Managua, an army base southeast of Havana. Six large crates, allegedly containing "rockets or some type of heavy artillery" were reportedly transported to the site. The activity probably involved antiaircraft weapons.

[REDACTED]

23 September 1960

The Soviet ship Solnechnogorsk arrived in Havana and off-loaded from 7 to 10 very large crates believed to contain Soviet helicopters. [REDACTED] the ship was carrying a large cargo of wheat and cotton, but the US military attaches in Havana were able personally to observe the unloading of the crates. The dimensions of the crates as well as the lack of security precautions, both during the voyage and in port, suggest they were additional helicopters. [REDACTED]

25 September 1960

TASS gave the following excerpt of Khrushchev's press interview at Glen Cove, New York:

Question: When Raul Castro was in Moscow you stated that in the case of US intervention against Cuba, the Soviet Union would strike at the United States. Do I have your statement right?

Answer: More or less right. But you needn't worry. Your commentator Lippmann wrote: "If." But since America does not intend to attack Cuba this means that there is no danger whatsoever." [REDACTED]

1 October 1960

The Soviet merchant ship Sergei Kirov was unloading the second major shipment of bloc arms under very strict security conditions in a port west of Havana. The ship carried more than 3,000 tons of cargo which probably was chiefly military equipment. [REDACTED] that armored vehicles, antiaircraft and field artillery, and more ammunition were included in the shipment. [REDACTED]

2 October 1960

All flights over the northern coast of Cuba were prohibited, perhaps to screen the unloading of bloc arms. One Soviet vessel was unloading in the area at that time and [REDACTED]

3 October 1960

A Cuban transfer of nearly \$4.5 million in pounds sterling from New York to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
account of the Czechoslovakian State Bank in London may have been a cash downpayment for the Cuban-Czech arms agreement. [REDACTED]

3 October 1960

[REDACTED] that militia and police units were receiving training in the use of "new arms"--probably of bloc origin--and that these weapons would not be issued until personnel were properly trained. [REDACTED]

7 October 1960

Cuba and Bulgaria signed a commercial agreement--under which Bulgaria agreed to buy at least 20,000 tons of Cuban sugar annually for the next five years--and a protocol on scientific and technical cooperation. Representatives of both countries then issued a joint statement announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations. [REDACTED]

7-8 October 1960

The Soviet ship Nikolai Burdenko with the third major shipment of bloc arms was unloading its more than 3,000 tons of cargo in a port west of Havana. The shipment probably consisted chiefly of military goods. Unconfirmed reports stated that MIG aircraft were delivered. [REDACTED]

11 October 1960

[REDACTED] that Cuban pilots probably were engaged in flight training in Czechoslovakia. The trainees probably were among the more than 100 Cubans which were sent to Czechoslovakia in July and August 1960 for military instruction. [REDACTED]

18 October 1960

The Soviet vessel Atkarsk arrived in Cuba with the fourth major shipment of bloc arms. It carried at least 2,400 tons of military cargo. Reports of the delivery of jet aircraft persisted, but remained unconfirmed. [REDACTED]

19 October 1960

The Soviet ambassador in Havana told [REDACTED] that while Soviet threats have probably precluded "a large organized invasion" by the US, the USSR would not

permit any armed incursions and "if the US wanted another Korea, or even a world war, it would bear the responsibility for it."

20 October 1960

Castro reportedly told the UAR ambassador that he had a written commitment from Moscow to "defend" Cuba "if necessary."

20 October 1960

a group of five Czechs were scheduled to arrive in Cuba. Presumably aircraft; as two of the individuals mentioned have been associated previously with Czech aircraft deliveries outside the bloc.

22 October 1960

Khrushchev showed his reluctance to be drawn into too precise a reiteration or elaboration of his 9 July rocket threat against the US. He told Cuban journalists he would like his statement regarding aid to Cuba in the case of armed aggression "really to be symbolic." Khrushchev added, "for this purpose it is essential that the imperialists' threat of intervention against Cuba shall not materialize into military operations, and then there will be no need to confirm the reality of our statement about armed assistance to the people of Cuba against aggression."

25 October 1960

The USSR lent its support in the UN to Cuba's charges that the United States was planning an imminent invasion of Cuba. Soviet support for Cuba on the same issue was again offered on 1 November.

25 October 1960

The Cuban embassy in Moscow to seek North Vietnamese agreement to a joint communique to be issued on 15 November announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations at the embassy level.

28 October 1960

The US Naval Attache in Havana reported the arrival of the Russian freighter Tiksi with large crates of deck cargo,

possibly containing arms of aircraft.
[REDACTED]

28 October 1960

The American Embassy in Havana reported a consensus among US military attaches in Cuba that the number of Soviet MIG aircraft mentioned in numerous reports as being in Cuba was highly exaggerated and possibly there were none at all. Their reports indicated a possibility, however, that there were from six to ten MIGs at the San Antonio de los Banos or San Julian airbases. [REDACTED]

28 October 1960

A source described as very reliable by the US Naval Attache reported that two thousand militiamen were undergoing training on a farm in Pinar Del Rio Province. The training reportedly included tank orientation, and four Russian tanks were seen at this location.
[REDACTED]

31 October 1960

A usually reliable source reported that Rio de Janeiro students and workers planned to stage a parade on 4 November in support of the Cuban revolution using funds from official and private Cuban sources. The Cuban charge d'affaires in Rio and a Brazilian Communist were allegedly responsible for coordinating the parade plans.
[REDACTED]

Late October 1960

Due to the fear of a possible invasion, naval ships began to be reactivated with all possible haste. Private yachts were commandeered to strengthen the coastal patrol. Two PF were the only ships not in service as of 15 November, and they were being prepared for sea at that time. All ships sail with Army security personnel. Most naval craft are patrolling off Pinar del Rio Province. [REDACTED]

2 November 1960

Following the ouster of Salvadoran President Lemus and the assumption of power by a six-man junta, the US embassy in San Salvador commented that it appeared likely that the way was now open for the full return of Cuban diplomatic representation in El Salvador--virtually suspended since early July--and the renewal of Cuban subversive activity within the country.
[REDACTED]

7 November 1960

The US Consul in Santiago de Cuba reported he had received reliable information that the Russian merchant ship Pskov arrived at an Oriente Province port on 7 November and unloaded between four and five thousand tons of guns and light army and naval artillery. Tight security measures were reportedly enforced during the week the Soviet ship was in port. Another report stated that on or about 5 November the Cuban government had stopped all vehicular traffic on the Mayari-Preston Road in Oriente Province to permit the unloading of an arms shipment from a Soviet vessel which had arrived at Mayari. The same report also stated that an "armored tank base" had been established near San Luis in Southern Oriente Province.

[REDACTED]

8 November 1960

Premier Fidel Castro, in a speech before a joint meeting of several Cuban labor unions, indicated that Cuba should not count on Soviet rockets for support against the United States. He said, "No, do not speak of rockets. I will tell you why; because that is too simple. The effort must be our own, and to defend ourselves we should think of trebling and quadrupling our efforts rather than comfortably expecting them /the USSR/ to send rockets against the enemies of the country."

[REDACTED]

11 November 1960

Nicaraguan rebel attacks near the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border apparently were made by conservatives as well as leftists, a few of whom had recently been in Cuba. Costa Rican and Nicaraguan charges that the rebels were backed by Cuba and reports of the presence of a few Cubans among the rebel forces have not yet been confirmed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

13 November 1960

The Guatemalan revolt of 13 November was apparently led by disaffected military officers with backing from opposition groups ranging from right to extreme left. While Cuban propaganda and subversion have been employed toward such an end in Guatemala as well as most other Latin American countries, there is still no evidence that the 13 November uprising was closely directed by Cuba. [REDACTED]

20 November 1960

National Bank president "Che" Guevara, speaking at a reception given in his honor in Peiping, said the Latin American people have "many things to learn from the achievements of the people's communes and all the other social systems adopted by China." He added, "It may be that one of these methods or something similar will be adopted by the Americas in pursuing the road of liberation when the first step has been taken--that is, the seizure of power by the workers and peasants." [REDACTED]

21 November 1960

"Che" Guevara, speaking before about 10,000 persons in Peiping, said that visitors to Cuba from all over the Western Hemisphere had asked how they too might achieve the "beautiful realities" Cuba had achieved. "When asked what to do to obtain all this," Guevara said, "Cuba can only answer that it will not be through ballot boxes, nor through building up an underground opposition, nor through winning parliamentary seats by cleverly maneuvering--as in hypocritical Latin American democracies. It is through armed struggle of the people sharply directed against the opposition clique. It is through arming the people and smashing the puppet dictatorial regime that a peoples' army supplants the latter regime." [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
ANNEX 1.

ARMS AND EQUIPMENT OF CUBAN ARMY

ITEM	ON HAND 1 Jan 59	Received during Period 1 Jan 59 - Present		Currently Available
		Free World Sources	Bloc Sources*	
1. Armored Vehicles				
a. Lt Tk, "3-man Dutch" (US)	8			8
b. Lt TkM3A1 (US)	12			12
c. Med Tk M4A1 w/76-mm Gun (US)	7			7
d. Med Tk Comet w/77-mm Gun (UK)	15			15
e. Scout Car, M3A1, White (US)	19			19
f. Armored Car, M8 (US)	20			20
g. Medium Tanks, T34 (USSR)			40	40
h. Assault Guns, SU-100			10	10
i. Armored Personnel Carriers, BTR-152			60	60
2. Motor Transport				
a. Sedans (US)	175			175
b. Jeeps (US)	599			599
c. Trucks (US)	158		15 (Czech)	173
d. Busses (US)	28			28
e. Ambulances (US)	19			19
f. Cmd Recon Car 3/4-ton (US)	4			4
g. Motor Cycles (US)	149			149
h. Special Purpose Vehicles	19			19
i. Trailer, 1/4-ton	30			30
j. Trailer, 3/4-ton	3			3
k. Trailer, 1 1/2-ton	6			6
l. Trailer, 1 1/2-ton water tank	1			1

* No positive identifications of major military items of Bloc origin have been made. The figures on arms received from Bloc sources are based on an analysis of tonnages delivered, types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are intended only to indicate a rough order of magnitude and should be considered as tentative.

ITEM	ON HAND 1 Jan 59	Received during Period 1 Jan 59 - Present		Currently Available
		Free World Sources	Bloc Sources*	
3. Artillery				
a. 25-mm Hotchkiss AA Gun (Fr)	16			16
b. 37-mm Gun M6 (US)	9			9
c. 57-mm Gun, Salute Gun (UK)	6			6
d. 75-mm Pack Howitzer (US)	8			8
e. 105-mm Howitzer, (Pack (It))		4		4
f. Field Gun, 85-mm			25	25
g. Howitzer, 122-mm			45	45
h. Antitank Gun, 30-mm			30	30
i. Antiaircraft gun, 85-mm and/or 57mm			50	50
j. Multiple rocket launcher, 130-mm			20 (Czech)	20
k. Antitank gun, 57-mm (or Recoilless Gun, 82-mm B10)			30	30
l. Gun Howitzer, 152-mm			10	10
4. Mortars				
a. 60-mm M2 (US)	17			17
b. 81-mm	14 (US)	72 (It)		86
c. 82-mm			120	120
d. 120-mm			30	30
5. Rocket Launchers				
a. Launcher, Grenade Cal 30 M7A3	75			75
b. Launcher, Grenade M8	60			60
c. Launcher, Rocket 3.5" M2	28(US)	70 (It)		98

* No positive identifications of major military items of Bloc origin have been made. The figures on arms received from Bloc sources are based on an analysis of tonnages delivered, types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are intended only to indicate a rough order of magnitude and should be considered as tentative.

ITEM	ON HAND 1 Jan 59	Received during Period 1 Jan 59 - Present		Currently Available
		Free World Sources	Bloc Sources*	
6. Recoilless Rifles				
a. 57-mm M18 (US)	9			9
b. 75-mm (US)	4			4
7. Machine Guns				
a. Browning Cal .30, M1919A6	103			103
b. Browning Cal .30, M1917	110			110
c. Browning Cal .50, M2	90			90
d. Colt Cal 30	69			69
e. Lewis, Cal 30	6			6
f. Vickers, Cal 30	11			11
g. MAG, light, 7.62-mm		500 (Bel)		500
h. Antiaircraft, 14.5-mm (or 12.7- mm)			30	30
8. Submachine Guns				
a. Thompson Cal 45 (US)	1,098			1,098
b. Steyr-Solothurn, 9-mm (Aust)	40			40
c. Marck-English, 9-mm	25			25
d. UZI FN, 9-mm	25	1,500 (Bel)		1,525
e. 9-mm, M23 (Czech)			10,000	10,000
f. Miscellaneous	105			105

* No positive identifications of major military items of Bloc origin have been made. The figures on arms received from Bloc sources are based on an analysis of tonnages delivered, types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are intended only to indicate a rough order of magnitude and should be considered as tentative.

ITEM	ON HAND 1 Jan 59	Received during Period 1 Jan 59 - Present		Currently Available
		Free World Sources	Bloc Sources*	
9. Rifles and Carbines				
a. Rifle, Cal 30 M1	5,700(US) 22,000(It)			27,700
b. Rifle, Cal 30, Springfield, 1903	17,400			17,400
c. Rifle, Cal 30, Mauser	1,000			1,000
d. Rifle, Cal 30, Enfield	7,800			7,800
e. Rifle, Sniper, Cal 30 M1903A4	27			27
f. Rifle, Cal 22, Mossberg	243			243
g. Rifle, 7.62-mm FN		26,000 (or more) (Bel)		26,000
h. Rifle, 7.62-mm			35,000	35,000
i. Rifle, assorted (held by Castro forces)	4-6,000			4-6,000
j. Rifle, Automatic, Browning, Cal 30	177			177
k. Rifle, Automatic, Mossberg, Cal 22	20			20
l. Carbine, Cal 30 M1 (US)	3,100			3,100
m. Carbine, Cristobal automatic, Cal 30 (D.R)	8,000			8,000
n. Carbine, Kragg, Cal 30	4,800			4,800

* No positive identifications of major military items of Bloc origin have been made. The figures on arms received from Bloc sources are based on an analysis of tonnages delivered, types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are intended only to indicate a rough order of magnitude and should be considered as tentative.

ITEM	ON HAND 1 Jan 59	Received during period 1 Jan 59 - Present		Currently Available
		Free World Sources	Bloc Sources*	
10. Pistols and Revolvers				
a. Pistol, Colt, M1911A1, Colt 45	1,120			1,120
b. Pistol, Star, Cal 45 (Sp)	300			300
c. Pistol, Remington, Cal 45	206			206
d. Pistols, assorted	200			200
e. Revolver, Colt, Cal 45 (US)	10,750			10,750
f. Revolver, SW, Cal 45 (US)	340			340
g. Revolver, Colt, Cal (US)	100			100
h. Revolver, SW, Cal 38	45			45
i. Revolver, Assorted	200			200
11. Ammunition **				
a. Cartridge, Cal 7.62		52,000,000 (Belg)		
b. Cartridge, 9-mm		3,000,000 (Belg)		
c. Cartridge, Cal 30		2,734,000 (Norway)		
d. Cartridge, Cal 50, Ball		1,920,000 (Norway & It)		
e. Cartridge, Cal 50, APIT&T		580,000 (It)		

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** It is not possible to estimate quantities of ammunition on hand on 1 Jan 59. There were substantial quantities of Cal 30, Cal 45, Cal 50, 60 and 81-mm mortar ammunition and some 3.5-inch rockets, handgrenades, and rifle grenades.

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ITEM	ON HAND 1 Jan 59	Received during Period 1 Jan 59 - Present		Currently Available
		Free World Sources	Bloc Sources*	
f. Shell, Mortar, 81-mm light		20,000 (It)		
g. Shell, Mortar, 81-mm heavy		12,000 (It)		
h. Shell, Mortar, 81-mm smoke		8,000 (It)		
i. Rocket, 3.5", heat		8,000 (It)		
j. Rocket, 3.5", practice		3,000 (It)		
k. Round, howitzer, 105-mm, M2A1		16,000 (It)		
l. Handgrenades, Mark II		20,000 (Norway)		
m. Antitank grenades		65,000 (Belg)		
n. Handgrenades, Assorted		15,000 (Belg)		
o. Assorted			6,000 Ton	
12. Communications Equipment				
a. Telephone, EE-8	24	140 (It)		164
b. Telephone, types unk	1423			1423
c. Switchboard, SB-18/GT	7			7
d. Switchboard, SB-22/PT	1			1
e. Switchboard, Type unk	41			41
f. Switchboard (10-line)		12 (It)		12
g. Switchboard (63-line)		3 (It)		3

*No positive identifications of major military items of Bloc origin have been made. The figures on arms received from Bloc sources are based on an analysis of tonnages delivered, types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are intended only to indicate a rough order of magnitude and should be considered as tentative.

ITEM	ON HAND 1 Jan 59	Received during Period 1 Jan 59 - Present		Currently Available
		Free World Sources	Bloc Sources*	
h. Radio Set, AN/GRC-7	1			1
i. Radio Set, AN/PRC6	39			39
j. Radio Set, AN/PRC-10	31			31
k. Radio Set, AN/VRC-10	1			1
l. Radio Sets, Misc	116			116
m. Remote Control Eq, AN/GRC-11	2			2
13. Miscellaneous				
a. Binoculars 6 x 30 (It)		35		35
b. Binoculars 8 x 30 (It)		25		25
c. Compass, MK III		60		60
d. Plotting Board M10	10			10
e. Riot Gun, Gas	73			73
f. Mines, HEAT M6	122			122
g. Flame Throwers (It)		7		7
h. Aiming Circle M1		3		3
i. Very Pistol (US)	56			56
j. Pyrotechnic Pro- jector, Hand, M19	17			17
k. Mine, AP		24,000 (Belg)		24,000
l. Radars, fire control			15 (USSR)	15

* No positive identifications of major military items of Bloc origin have been made. The figures on arms received from Bloc sources are based on an analysis of tonnages delivered, types and quantities of material delivered by the Bloc to other countries, the size of the Cuban military forces, and reports received from Cuba. The estimated figures are intended only to indicate a rough order of magnitude and should be considered as tentative.

ANNEX 2.

CUBAN AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT

	1958		1960	
	PROP	JET	PROP	JET
<u>FIGHTER</u>				
F 47	14		3	
F 51			1	
Sea Fury			14	
Sub Total	<u>14</u>		<u>18</u>	
<u>LT BMR</u>				
B 26	17		13	
Sub Total	<u>17</u>		<u>13</u>	
<u>A.S.W.</u>				
TBM-38			6	
Sub Total			<u>6</u>	
<u>TRANSPORT</u>				
C-47	10		8	
VC-53	1			
C-46			4	
C-54			2	
Lockheed-Lodestar			1	
Sub Total	<u>11</u>		<u>15</u>	
<u>HELICOPTER</u>				
H-19			1	
HOUND (MI-4) (USSR)			6	
H-13			9	
Sub Total			<u>16</u>	
<u>TRAINER & MISCELLANEOUS</u>				
PA 18	5			
N 2S			6	
T 33		8		7
OT 6	7		6	
T 7	11			
Cessna 310			2	
PBY-5A			2	
C-45			1	
L-20			1	
Sub Totals	<u>13</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>7</u>
Grand Totals	55	8	86	7

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ANNEX 3

SOVIET BLOC POLICY TOWARD CUBA

1. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has gone a long way in identifying itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. Following a relatively long period of temporizing, Moscow first moved to establish close relations with Havana last February through the visit of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan. The Joint communique issued at that time provided the outline for future Cuban political support of the Bloc in the international arena, in return, for substantial Soviet economic assistance to Castro. Soviet activities in exploiting the rapid deterioration of US-Cuban relations, however, were inhibited at that time by the impending summit conference and President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to the USSR.
2. With the collapse of the summit in May and the cancellation of the President's trip, these inhibitions were removed and the Bloc launched a more intensive drive to expand its political and economic influence in the Castro regime. Exploitation of the Cuban situation became a prominent element in Khrushchev's aggressive post-summit campaign to isolate the US and brand it before world opinion as openly pursuing a policy of aggression and provocation. Khrushchev's acceptance on 3 June of an invitation to visit Havana symbolized the new boldness of Moscow's moves to demonstrate the USSR's ability to breach the Monroe Doctrine and challenge the U.S. in its own backyard. Missions by

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key Cuban officials to the Bloc presaged further important gains in Bloc influence over the Cuban economy and Soviet willingness to move ahead with military assistance. The new and aggressive phase of Soviet support was highlighted in July by a series of public statements pledging Bloc aid against any economic or military measures that the US might undertake against Cuba.

3. In a speech on 9 July, Khrushchev declared, "figuratively speaking, Soviet artillerists, in the event of necessity, can with their rocket firepower support the Cuban people if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare begin intervention against Cuba." A communique signed by Khrushchev and Raul Castro on 21 July stated that the USSR "would use every means to prevent US armed intervention against Cuba." These pronouncements were designed to deter any military intervention by anti-Castro forces and to place the USSR in a position to claim credit for having protected Cuba if such intervention does not occur. Khrushchev, however, has carefully avoided any binding public commitments to take military actions in the event of an external attack on Cuba. When asked about his "rocket threat" at a press interview on 25 September, Khrushchev said "You needn't worry....Since America does not intend to attack Cuba, this means that there is no danger whatsoever." There is no evidence of a formal mutual defense treaty between the USSR and Cuba and it is unlikely that Moscow would be willing to undertake any commitment of this

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nature. Khrushchev's interview with Cuban journalists on 22 October showed his reluctance to be drawn into too precise a reiteration or elaboration of his 9 July statement. In response to a request by the Cubans to comment on the "imperialist" contention that the "rocket threat" was "purely symbolic," Khrushchev said, "I should like such statements to be really symbolic, as the enemies of the Cuban revolution say." He added that it is "essential that the imperialists' threat of intervention" does not materialize so that there will be no need "to test the reality of our statement concerning armed assistance to the Cuban people against aggression." In an apparent effort to avoid any impression that he was retreating from his July statement, Khrushchev assured the Cubans that Soviet rockets were ready in case of need.

4. The statements in July were coupled with official attacks on the validity of the Monroe Doctrine and a significant expansion of Bloc relations with Cuba. For the first time Khrushchev also injected the USSR into the issue of the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay by charging that a "treaty without a time limit on terms enslaving to a small nation is sheer iniquity," and pledging Soviet support for Cuba should the US undertake "aggressive action" against the Castro regime, in reply to any further "legitimate" demand by Havana. Following a vigorous US reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, a TASS statement dismissed it as "long defunct" and charged the US with using it as a cover to meddle in

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Latin American affairs. The Soviet UN delegation also provided full support for Cuban charges against the US in the Security Council.

5. In the past three months the Bloc has further solidified its position--all Bloc countries except Albania, Outer Mongolia, and East Germany have now established formal diplomatic relations and most of these have signed economic agreements with Cuba. The USSR and some other members of the Bloc have apparently gone to considerable lengths to grant Cuban economic requirements top priority. They have also continued to reaffirm their support for Castro through public statements and extensive propaganda agitation.
6. Moscow's support of the Castro regime and its exploitation of tense Cuban-American relations is part of its larger and more extensive effort to isolate the US. Cuban complaints against the US in the UN thus provide the ideal vehicle for advancing Moscow's own objectives and provide Soviet charges with greater credibility and non-Bloc support. The existence of an openly anti-US regime in Latin America provides the USSR with some documentation for its claim that US power and influence is declining. The close relationship between the Bloc and the Castro government also serves to demonstrate the Communist claim that the Monroe Doctrine is invalid and that, as Togliatti put it, "no international problem can be treated without taking into account the existence of the socialist nations. Cuba, the

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Congo....are all problems that must be examined and resolved in light of this new balance of power."

7. The bloc's immediate aim appears to be exploitation of the situation to discredit US policy and arouse neutralist sentiment against the US in the UN. There is ample evidence that Moscow hopes to encourage neutralist action by fostering the impression that a US invasion of Cuba could be imminent and that the USSR might intervene. As early as July, when the US reduced the Cuban sugar quota, the USSR began to put pressure on neutralist states for support of Cuba by drawing parallels with the Suez crisis. More recently, both the Bloc and Cuba have carried on an extensive psychological warfare campaign claiming that US attack has for the time being been forestalled through Soviet warnings and Cuba's increasing preparedness.
8. Cuba provides a better base of operations for subversion and propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. They will probably avoid seeking an open Communist seizure of power in Cuba or elsewhere. A strongly anti-American and pro-Soviet but not avowedly Communist regime like Castro's serves their purpose far better; it gives a native color to Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention. At the present stage, the main Soviet aim will be to help the Castroist movement and its imitators throughout Latin America to win a mass following, primarily in

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
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order to pressure governments toward anti-US stands. The Soviet leaders realize that, because of the history of the inter-American system and past US preeminence in diplomatic, economic, and military affairs, setbacks for the US in Latin America will be doubly injurious to the US world position.

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ANNEX 4



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ANNEX 5

Dates of Diplomatic Recognition of the Castro Regime by Selected Countries

United States	-----	January 7, 1959
Belgium	-----	January 7, 1959
France	-----	January 7, 1959
Canada	-----	January 8, 1959
United Kingdom	-----	January 7, 1959
USSR	-----	January 10, 1959
Czechoslovakia	-----	May 17, 1960*
Poland	-----	June 15, 1960*
North Korea	-----	August 29, 1960*
Communist China	-----	September 28, 1960*
Bulgaria	-----	October 8, 1960*
Rumania	-----	October 26, 1960*

* The dates given are those on which the respective Bloc countries announced their intention to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

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